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DUALIST CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY AND THE REPUBLICAN 
REVOLUTION OF 1800 
John J. Janssen* 
American constitutional development, Bruce Ackerman ar-
gues in his recent book, should be understood in terms of three 
regime-transformative moments: the Constitutional Founding, 
Reconstruction, and the New Deal.t The first moment, Professor 
Ackerman explains, sheds much light on how to interpret the 
subsequent moments.z Ackerman's book, the first volume of a 
proposed trilogy on constitutional development, may be, as some 
reviewers say, one of the most important works on constitutional 
theory to date.3 Such praise, however, should be accorded only if 
the theory comports with historical fact. 
This essay begins needed empirical inquiry into Ackerman's 
theory of constitutional development by assessing it in the con-
text of a particular constitutionally significant historical moment: 
the rise of the Jeffersonian Republicans in 1800. In his book, 
Ackerman gives relatively little attention to this moment of con-
stitutional development, which, by conventional historical ac-
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1. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap Press, 1991) ("We the 
People"). 
2. The successful appeal to popular sovereignty at the Founding, for example, blot-
ted out technical irregularities otherwise required for constitutional amendment. 
3. On the back jacket of We the People (cited in note 1), Cass Sunstein comments, 
"This is a truly distinguished contribution to constitutional thought, one that will reorient 
the field in major ways." Sanford Levinson's praise of Ackerman printed on the book 
jacket and elsewhere is no less flattering. See Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitu-
tional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? 
(A) <26; (B) 26; (C) >26; (D) All of the Above), 8 Const. Comm. 409 (1991); see also 
Judith N. Shklar, Book Review, 86 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 775 (1992). But see Michael J. 
Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's The-
ory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759,760 (1992) (rejecting the democratic 
theory that drives Ackerman's analysis); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 918 (1992) (arguing that Ackerman's work "fails to inspire, because it is 
mired in a fictional past and envisions a utopian future."). 
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counts, resulted in a second American revolution.4 The post-
1800 Republican efforts, Ackerman explains, do constitute suc-
cessful "constitutional politics," but the Republican regime 
neither fundamentally replaced the pre-existing principles of 
government, nor followed critical events of such force as the Civil 
War or Great Depression, and thus do not constitute a revolu-
tionary or constitutionally significant moment. The 1800 revolu-
tion was "less sweeping" than both Reconstruction and the New 
DeaLs The less sweeping nature of the transformation results, 
Ackerman suggests, from Jefferson's reluctance to "trumpet his 
role as popular tribune very loudly."6 
In Part I of this Paper, I first review the two basic postulates 
of Ackerman's constitutional theory: (1) that periodic moments 
of regime-transformative politics occur, and (2) that super-major-
ities, not typical policymaking majorities, demonstrably win these 
struggles. For purposes of testing these postulates at any histori-
cal moment, I then propose a set of criteria. A potentially trans-
formative moment, I maintain, could be identified by any 
combination of (1) a highly mobilized electorate, (2) fundamen-
tally opposed policy views across society, or (3) judicial decisions 
with major policy impact. For purposes of determining whether 
super-majorities win these transformative struggles, the sole cri-
terion is widespread acceptance of the new, transformative, 
policy. 
In Part II, I review Ackerman's interpretation of the 1800 
Republican revolution and test it by applying the criteria speci-
fied in Part I, beginning with whether the Federalist-Republican 
conflict constitutes a transformative moment. To determine 
whether there were fundamental policy conflicts, I examine three 
controversies: the Alien and Sedition Acts and opposition to the 
federal government, anti-commercialism and civic virtue, and the 
federal judicial circuit. To determine whether the electorate was 
mobilized, I focus on studies of partisan realignment, with due 
attention to the fledgling nature of party machinery in 1800. An 
examination of contemporary judicial behavior implicates a re-
view of Marbury v. Madison and other cases in their political 
context. The application of these first criteria leads me to the 
conclusion that Jefferson's campaign constitutes a moment of po-
tentially transformative politics. 
4. See e.g., Bernard Bailyn, et a!., The GreaJ Republic, A History of the American 
People (D.C. Heath and Co., 1977); Daniel Sisson, The American Revolution of 1800 (Al-
fred A. Knopf, 1974). 
5. We the People at 196 (cited in note 1). 
6. ld. at 73. 
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Part III applies the criterion for determining whether a 
super-majority wins the struggle. The establishment of a legiti-
mized party system, retrenchment of commercialism, a new natu-
ralization act, and reform of the federal judiciary support the 
conclusion that transformative policy was implemented success-
fully. But some transformative policies survived only a short 
while, and Republicans would ultimately revive selected Federal-
ist programs. The party system endured as a manifestation of 
legitimate opposition, but the system's creation was meant to be 
temporary. Major ideological contours of the regime, however, 
endured until 1828, and the significance that Jeffersonians 
ascribed to the national election of 1800 for presidential author-
ity would give rise to the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. Part III 
concludes that Ackerman's account of the 1800 revolution is ap-
propriate, but also suggests that his theory may be limited to ex-
plaining only intended constitutional change, for the advent of 
political parties cannot be accommodated squarely by the theory. 
I. DUALIST CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND AN 
EMPIRICAL TEST 
Dualist constitutional theory may be reduced to two major 
postulates: (1) that periodic moments of regime-transformative 
politics occur, and (2) that super-majorities, not typical poli-
cymaking majorities, demonstrably win these struggles. The first 
postulate rests largely on a distinction that Ackerman finds ad-
vanced in The Federalist Papers between the normal institutions 
of representative government and "the people themselves," 
which are authoritatively superior to the former but only rarely 
present.? In support of the distinction, Ackerman also cites 
7. A key paper for Ackerman is No. 40, where Publius (in this case Madison) de-
fends the Convention against the claim that it deviated from its charge of modifying the 
Article of Confederation. Publius maintains that the Convention is making an appeal to 
"the people themselves," who trump the formalism of text: 
Let us view the ground on which the Convention stood .... They must have 
reflected that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to 
give way to substance; that a rigid adherence [to forms] would render ... nuga-
tory the transcendent and precious rights of the people to "abolish or alter their 
governments ... ,"since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and univer-
sally to move in concert ... ; it is therefore essential that such changes be insti-
tuted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic 
and respectable ... citizens .... [Indeed the Convention] must have recollected 
that it was by this irregular and assumed [method) that the States were first 
united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient gov-
ernment; .... They must have borne in mind that as the plan to be framed and 
pr~posed was to be submitted to the people themselves, the disapprobation of 
this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antece-
dent errors and irregularities. 
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Gordon Wood's account of "conventions" as manifestations of 
"the people themselves" occasionally arising in order to tran-
scend normal political institutions and fashion public policy truly 
responsive to the interests of the people.s These rare moments 
of government by the people themselves illuminate the regime-
transformative politics element of the theory. Moments of "con-
stitutional politics," as Ackerman calls them, refer to a "series of 
political movements that have ... called upon their fellow Amer-
icans to engage in acts of citizenship that, when successful, 
culminate[ ] in the proclamation of higher law in the name of We 
the People. "9 In focusing on the New Deal and Reconstruction 
eras as successful constitutional politics,10 Ackerman suggests 
that regime-transformation implies major change in basic govern-
mental structure or the political principles around which society 
is organized. Mere shifts in means-Keynesian versus 
monetarist monetary policy, for example-probably do not 
qualify. 
The second major theme of Ackerman's theory is rooted in 
his position that "the people themselves" may speak through the 
formalism of Article V or the informalism of its "convention" 
provisions. The legislative majorities required under Article V 
are super-majorities. Ackerman understands the respect for con-
vention politics under Article V to stand as historically informed 
recognition that "the people themselves" hold ultimate constitu-
tional discretion. 
Reduced to its two basic postulates, Ackerman's theory 
lends itself to empirical testing. A set of criteria may be formu-
lated for whether the conditions required by each postulate ob-
tain during the moment under investigation. 
1. A transformative political moment. A moment would be 
considered transformative only if pre-existing governing princi-
ples or structures fundamentally change. Thus, a necessary con-
dition of constitutional politics is potentially transformative 
change in public policy. Transformative rhetoric should be in-
cluded in this category, because any fundamental change usually 
will be preceded by calls for such change. This criterion requires 
examining the nature of policy proposals. The concept of consti-
tutional politics also rests on the quasi-empirical assumption that 
We the People at 173-74 (cited in note 1) (quoting The Federalist, No. 40 (James 
Madison)). 
8. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 at 306-343 
(U. of N. Carolina Press, 1969). 
9. We The People at 7 (cited in note 1). 
10. See id. at 58-130. 
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"the people themselves" are present,n suggesting that the electo-
rate would be highly mobilized, producing high voter turnout and 
possibly a shift in partisanship across the electorate. 
Judicial behavior deserves consideration because of the 
Court's guardian relationship to constitutional law. The exercise 
of judicial review following or during moments of electoral up-
heaval likely suggests that policies favored by new legislative ma-
jorities depart from pre-existing, paradigmatic higher law. Thus 
judicial review may be a strong indicator of transformative poli-
tics. The Court, however, also might interpret the Constitution 
so as to initiate transformative political change and do so without 
concomitant electoral upheaval.I2 Such policymaking would, in 
effect, constitute a form of transformative politics and require at-
tention to how the electoral and political forces respond. 
2. Super-majorities win. At one level, the method for deter-
mining whether the super-majoritarian interest wins seems sim-
ple: first, locate what the super-majoritarian interest is, and 
second, following the transformative moment, determine 
whether that interest has been translated into law or public pol-
icy. Determining the super-majoritarian interest, however, may 
not be as easy as reading the signs and placards carried by the 
visible members of interest groups. And even if the criteria for 
transformative moments help to specify these interests, the mere 
translation of them into public policy may not constitute a vic-
tory. If the changes endure only a short while, was the moment 
genuinely transformative or ultimately static? The super-
majoritarian feature of dualist theory would, it seems, require the 
transformative change to be demonstrably attributable to super-
majoritarian will. Thus, the best criterion here seems the extent 
to which the changes reach mainstream status.B The absence of 
challenge will be viewed as tacit approval, simply on the ground 
that patterns and practices that go relatively unchallenged are 
considered legitimate. 
11. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
12. The Warren Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision and its subsequent 
impact on race policy arguably constitute a fundamental change in governing principle 
not generated by electoral upheaval. Ackerman recognizes this, noting that the problem 
with Brown (and Griswold) is the top-down prophesying by the Court. See We the People 
at 139-40 (cited in note 1). He finds, nevertheless, that Chief Justice Warren's opinion in 
Brown represents an effort to synthesize disparate elements of the three governing re-
gimes in American constitutional history. Id. at 142-50. 
13. In his discussion of how to assess the implementation of public policy, William 
Clune also relies on this criterion. See William H. Clune III, A Political Model of Imple-
mentation and the Implications of the Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing 
Roles of Law and Lawyers, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 47, 91 (1983). 
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II. APPLYING THE TEST TO THE REVOLUTION 1800: 
WAS THERE TRANSFORMATIVE 
POTENTIAL14 
A. FUNDAMENTAL POLICY CONFLICf AND RHETORIC 
Over the course of the 1790s, the Federalist and Republican 
parties opposed each other on several fundamental issues: type 
of political economy, foreign policy and the nature of the Ameri-
can state, political organization and the public voice, and the le-
gitimacy of opposition. 
1. Political economy and the threat to civic vinue. Through-
out the 1790s, the Federalists sought to implement Hamilton's 
14. For those readers not familiar with the major events of the 1790s up to 1800, the 
following summary might help. The differences between the Federalists and the 
Republicans were rooted in the division between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. 
The former sought a larger central government more capable of securing commercial 
interests. The latter sought better but less powerful national government and favored an 
agrarian political economy, largely because of its promise for securing civic virtue. 
Madison, Hamilton and Jefferson had been Federalists during the Constitutional 
Founding period, but Hamilton's economic program and the French Revolution would 
revive debates about political economy and central authority and divide some former 
allies into Federalist and Republican camps. 
In four reports to Congress, Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury, detailed his 
economic plans for the country. In short, he sought: revolutionary war debt consolidation 
by the central government, with securities issued to finance it; a national bank; duties and 
taxes as a means of making payments on the debt; and industrialization. Through groups 
and friends in the various states, Hamilton and the Federalists also sought more 
allegiance to the national government as a means of promoting their interests. They also 
favored a bigger standing army. Opponents often viewed commercialism as suspect and 
began to view the Federalists as nearly as monarchical as the Crown had been. 
As the French Revolution widened into the French-British war in the early 1790s, the 
Federalists and Republicans supported the side which better served their interests. The 
French principles emulated by Republicans, according to Federalists, would destroy 
American society, if so transplanted. When the Federalists, aiming to avoid renewed war 
with Britain, negotiated the Jay Treaty, which essentially revitalized British rule of 1756, 
opponents charged that the Federalists were compromising the nation's security. French 
efforts to bribe American diplomats served as fodder for the Federalists. Near the close 
of the decade, a "quasi-war" at sea between the Americans and French had begun. 
Republicans organized their opposition to Federalist programs by mobilizing the 
polity and press, with Jefferson becoming the ideological leader. Economic depression 
and the quasi-war with France had led the Federalists to enact some repressive measures, 
the most notable of which were the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Acts were purportedly 
to preserve national security. In the eyes of Republicans, however, the acts were 
Federalist maneuvers to eliminate opposition. The Republicans responded by drafting 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which maintained that States could decide the 
constitutionality of federal legislation and interpose themselves between the citizenry and 
the central government. 
John Adams' negotiated settlement of the quasi-war angered some Federalists, 
splitting the party's support; and in 1800, the Republicans won the Presidency and Vice-
Presidency. Jefferson and fellow Republican Aaron Burr tied in the number of electoral 
votes garnered, so the election actually was resolved in the House of Representatives, 
which eventually selected Jefferson as president. The Federalists left office peaceably in 
1801, but Adams staffed the federal judiciary with Federalist judges prior to his departure. 
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vision of commercialism by establishing a national bank, issuing 
securities on a centrally consolidated national debt, and levying 
taxes and duties for government-sponsored internal improve-
ments.ls In 1793, in direct response to Hamilton's program, Jef-
ferson outlined a Republican agenda. It included abolition of the 
national bank, reduction of the impost tax, repeal of the excise 
tax, and exclusion of public debt-holders from Congress.16 Over 
the course of the decade, Jefferson emerged as the political 
leader of the Republican party.17 Activist contributors to news-
papers and political pamphleteers also developed the Republican 
agenda and communicated it to the public, often citing the dan-
gers to the farmer and civic virtue posed by commercialism.ls 
The 1800 Republican party platform, as printed in the Philadel-
phia Aurora, promised voters: Decrease of Public Debt, Reduced 
15. Conflict over Alexander Hamilton's economic vision for the country antedated 
the ratification of the Constitution. Thus the same basic economic program that Hamil-
ton advanced in 1790 and 1791, as Joseph Charles suggests, would hardly seem adequate 
cause for the ensuing strife between Federalists and Republicans. See Joseph Charles, 
The Origins of the American Party System 97 (Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, 1956). The resulting acrimony may be best explained by what Lance Banning 
describes as the suffused hypersensitivity to State encroachment on liberty, informed by 
Revolutionary maxims. See Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion 127 (Cornell U. 
Press, 1978). 
16. Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion at 181 (cited in note 15). 
17. Jefferson's predilection for agrarian interests had been public knowledge since 
his Notes on the State of Virginia, where he commented that "those who labor in the earth 
are the chosen people of God." See Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republi-
cans 220-21 (U. of N. Carolina Press, 1957) (The comment may be found in Thomas 
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 164-65 (William Peden, ed., W.W. Norton & Co., 
1954)). When Jefferson's criticism of the Hamilton's economic program was printed with-
out his knowledge or approval, a Federalist propaganda campaign followed. A series of 
political essays penned by "Publicola," who was actually John Quincy Adams, defended 
Federalist policies. Federalists positions were also advanced in Discourses on Davila. 
Madison and Jefferson responded to the campaign by helping to establish a national 
newspaper that would print articles opposing printed Federalist positions-the National 
Gazette. Between 1791 and 1793, the Gazette would serve as a forum for developing a 
cohesive Republican party ideology. See Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion at 155-60, 
182-94 (cited in note 15); see also Cunningham, at 10-15 supra. 
18. Political pamphlets were also a means of Republican political expression. 
George Logan, who had contributed to the Gazette under the pen name "An American 
Farmer," published pamphlets attacking programs that threatened to depress the agricul-
tural population and attributed the economic woes of the country to those citizens "infat-
uated with the false principles of the government of Great Britain." See Banning, The 
Jeffersonian Persuasion at 186-92 (cited in note 15). This association of the Federalists 
with Britain became more important, indeed politically divisive, later in the decade. The 
most important pamphleteer of the decade was John Taylor, whose An Enquiry into Prin-
ciples and Tendency ofCenain Public Measures (1794) stood nearly as an unofficial state-
ment of Republican principles. Taylor saw Federalist programs as predicated in 
misinterpretation of the Constitution and favored strict construction of the text. He also 
maintained that since government depends on the people for its life, it must always seek 
the general good. The National Bank, then, had to be dismantled, as it served to make 
the rich richer and the poor poorer. See id. at 192-200. 
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Taxes, No Loans, No Excises, Reduced Public Salaries, and a sys-
tem of economy and care of the public money.19 
2. Foreign policy and nature of the American state. The 
French Revolution, as Richard Hofstadter explains, forced 
American leaders "to make decisions about foreign policy that 
were bound to have either a British or a French bias, that made 
the party breach unnegotiable and almost irreconcilable."2o Jay's 
treaty with Britain in 1794, amid the war between Britain and 
France, fomented the division. Prior to the treaty, the British 
had announced plans to remain in Northwest territory indefi-
nitely and also seized cargoes of American ships carrying provi-
sions to or from French islands. Jay's treaty stipulated that 
Britain would leave its Northwest posts, expand commerce with 
the United States, and pursue an arbitrated settlement of prewar 
debts and other disputes. The Americans agreed not to trade 
with British peacetime enemy colonies, to grant Britain most-fa-
vored-nation trading status, and to pay out of government funds 
many American debts to British merchants.21 
The Federalists maintained that the treaty was essential for 
national security, since it would ameliorate tensions with Brit-
ain-a military power capable of inflicting substantial damages 
on the United States. In so doing, it would preserve the progress 
of Hamilton's economic programs. Rejecting the treaty, they 
charged, would force the United States into an alliance with 
France and that country's global struggles.22 An alliance with 
France would also increase the domestic influence of French 
principles, and these principles, most Federalists believed, would 
destroy American society. As for whether the treaty limitations 
imposed on Congress regarding the regulation of commerce vio-
lated the Constitution, Federalists simply maintained that the 
Constitution assigned the president authority to make treaties 
with the Senate's advice and consent.23 
Republicans loathed the treaty. From their perspective, it 
compromised national interests by renouncing "sequestration, 
19. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans at 214 (cited in note 17} (reproduc-
ing the party ticket printed in the Philadelphia Aurora, October 14, 1800). 
20. Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System 88 (U. of Calif. Press, 1969). 
21. Richard Buel comments on the risks the United States took in relinquishing the 
possibility of sequestration, given the U.S. Britain trade imbalance: "Everyone knew that, 
given the balance of trade between the two nations, British debts in America would al-
ways far exceed American debts in Britain. Thus by giving up an instrument of substan-
tial power over Britain while Britain gave up nothing, the United States risked permanent 
subordination." Richard Buel, Jr., Securing the Revolution 63 (Cornell U. Press, 1972). 
22. Id. at 69. 
23. Id. at 70. 
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nonintercourse, and discrimination" against Britain-"the only 
weapons [the United States] possessed for bringing Great Britain 
to terms short of war."24 The treaty, Republicans charged, 
clearly aligned the United States with Britain against France, the 
greater defender of liberty. With regard to the presidential au-
thority to negotiate the treaty, Republicans maintained that Jay's 
treaty represented an unconstitutional aggrandizement of execu-
tive authority: it could ultimately lodge all congressional and ju-
dicial power in the hands of the president and Senate. As 
Richard Buel comments, Republicans saw the exercise of presi-
dential power represented in Jay's treaty as "an argument for ar-
istocracy and monarchy."2s In 1799, Jefferson noted his 
opposition to "monarchising" features of the Constitution.26 
3. Political organization and public opinion. The framers of 
the Constitution generally denounced political parties as divisive 
forces that would threaten the fabric of the republic. Richard 
Hofstadter observes that "[t]he idea of a legitimate opposition-
recognized opposition, organized and free enough in its activities 
to be able to displace an existing government by peaceful 
means-is an immensely sophisticated idea" that the Framers of 
the Constitution had neither developed nor imagined at the re-
public's inception.21 But party organization began with the rise 
of opposition to Hamilton's economic program announced in 
1790, whereupon Federalists responded by building coalitions of 
support. Over time, party organization moved from Congress to 
state machinery, and, as party conflict evolved, Cunningham ob-
serves, "warnings against the dangers and evils of parties grew 
louder and were heard more often. "2s 
Both Republicans and Federalists acknowledged the polit-
ical vice usually associated with parties, so that neither tended to 
view their party machinery as a permanent addendum to the 
American political process. Republicans understood their party 
machinery as essential to preservation of the Union; once the cri-
sis ended, the machinery would dissolve. The Federalists were 
more vociferous in denouncing political parties, urging instead 
common support of the government.29 But they nurtured their 
24. Id. at 63. 
25. Id. at 70. 
26. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans at 211 (cited in note 17) (quoting 
Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, January 26, 1799, Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson 327-29 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1892-99)). 
27. Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System at 8 (cited in note 20). 
28. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans at 140 (cited in note 17). 
29. Id. at 141 (noting that many sermons in New England addressed the evils of 
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own party organizations so as to compete with Republican polit-
ical forces. By 1796, candidates for public office were running on 
party tickets, and some states were using party organizations to 
nominate candidates. By 1800, party committees at the local 
level had become means of informing and mobilizing voters. 
As the 1800 election approached, the Republicans imple-
mented an unprecedented programmatic effort to mobilize the 
public through party machinery and elevate the significance of 
national elections for the presidency. They sought not only to 
improve their party machinery across all states, but also to re-
form laws regarding the choice of presidential electors, so as to 
favor Republicans.3o Initially, Federalists denounced partisan at-
tempts to control the selection of presidential electors, but ulti-
mately they too encouraged biased reform in elector selection 
laws.31 
4. Legitimate opposition. Following the French seizures of 
American ships in response to the Jay Treaty, the Federalists se-
cured passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts.32 The Alien Act 
authorized the president to expel, imprison, or fine dangerous 
aliens, contingent upon declaration of war. The Sedition Act 
criminalized any organization, conspiracy, or open criticism of 
the government or any of its agents, and could apply to domestic 
political opposition in times of peace. 
The Federalists maintained that the Acts were essential for 
national security. John Marshall, one of the most eloquent Fed-
eralist spokesmen, defended the Acts in a 1798 address. Under 
the Constitution, he observed, Congress has the authority to de-
fine and punish offenses against the law of nations, and "it is an 
offence against that law [of nations] to become dangerous to the 
peace and safety or to be concerned in any treasonable or secret 
parties and that the "political parsons" delivering the sermons often had Republicans in 
mind). 
30. Id. at 144-47. 
31. Id. 
32. A brief history of the Acts might help. The French had responded to the Jay 
Treaty by seizing American ships, just as the British had done prior to the Treaty. Diplo-
matic efforts failed to resolve the conflicts and led to limited hostilities between French 
and American forces. The Republicans were outraged at the hostilities, but their call for 
a review of the failed diplomatic proceedings led to revelation of the embarrassing XYZ 
affair, in which French diplomats requested a loan, a bribe and an apology (for remarks 
made by Adams) from U.S. diplomats. The Republicans maintained that the disclosure 
was yet another attempt by the Federalists to malign France and destroy support for the 
principles of liberty enshrined by the French republic. But the ongoing hostilities and ~e 
XYZ affair led public opinion to tum against France. The Federalists then began a lim-
ited naval war with the French, which would last two years. During the patriotic fervor of 
this moment, the Federalists managed to enact the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
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machinations against the government of the country in which he 
resides."33 Marshall interpreted both Congress' power to sup-
press rebellions and the guarantee to each state of a republican 
form of government under the Constitution to imply an affirma-
tive duty on the central government of protecting states from in-
vasion, with congressional access to any necessary means for 
executing the duty. Removing dangerous aliens, he maintained, 
is a legitimate method of satisfying that duty.34 The principle 
could be abused, "but the possibility of abusing a principle is 
never supposed to be a correct argument against its use. "3s The 
attacks on the sedition law, moreover, were unwarranted, be-
cause to deny government the power to punish "false, scandalous 
and malicious" writings "would be to assert the inability of our 
nation to preserve its own peace, and to protect themselves from 
the attempt of wicked citizens ... incessantly employed in devis-
ing means to disturb the public peace." The Constitution forbids 
all abridgement of the freedom of the press, but it is nevertheless 
necessary to inquire whether an act in question "does in fact 
abridge the freedom of the press ... A punishment of ... licen-
tiousness is not considered as a restriction of the freedom of the 
press."36 
The Republicans argued that the Acts, particularly the sedi-
tion law, were oppressive measures, inconsistent with fundamen-
tal liberties of criminal procedure and free expression guaranteed 
under the Constitution. Under the sedition law, a person might 
be convicted by a jury for merely having an opinion, unless he 
could persuade the jury his opinion was true. The sedition law 
would not only intimidate critics of the government and those 
who would print criticisms, but, as Madison charged, make elec-
tions meaningless. The law would insulate incumbents from op-
ponents' criticisms, so that voters "will be compelled to make 
their election between competitors whose pretensions they are 
not permitted by the act equally to examine, to discuss, and to 
ascertain. "37 
Jefferson and Madison, respectively, wrote the Republican 
opposition ideology into the resolutions issued by the Kentucky 
33. J. Marshall, Address on Constitutionality of Alien and Sedition Laws, in M. 
Frisch and R. Stevens, eds., The Political Thought of American Statesmen 106 (F.E. Pea-
cock Publishers, 1973). 
34. I d. at 107. 
35. ld. at 108. 
36. Id. at 113. 
37. Buel, Securing the Revolution at 250 (cited in note 21) (quoting James Madison's 
"Report of the Committee," from Gaillard Hunt, ed., 6 The Writings of James Madison 
397-98 (Knickerbocker Press, 1906)). 
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and Virginia legislatures in response to the Alien and Sedition 
Acts. Madison advanced the doctrine of interposition-that the 
states could judge the constitutionality of federal acts and inter-
pose themselves between their citizens and illegitimate actions by 
the central government. He admonished that liberal construction 
of the Constitution would serve to increase centralized authority, 
thereby increasing the tendency toward monarchy. He also 
maintained that the sedition law abridged the First Amendment 
guarantee of free expression of ideas, the very principle essential 
to the survival of free society.3s Jefferson emphasized the au-
thority reserved to the States and the people themselves under 
the Constitution. "[E]very State has a natural right in cases not 
within the compact, ... to nullify of their own authority all as-
sumptions of power by others within their limits: that without 
this right, they would be under the dominion, absolute and un-
limited, of whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for 
them."39 
B. ELECTORAL MoBILIZATION 
Partisan realignments, as Walter Dean Burnham explains, 
are shifts in partisanship across the electorate that "arise from 
emergent tensions in society which, not adequately controlled by 
the organization or outputs of party politics as usual, escalate to a 
flash point." "They are," he continues, "issue-oriented phenom-
ena, centrally associated with these tensions and more or less 
leading to resolution adjustments ... [and] transformations in the 
general shape of policy. "40 Thus the concept suggests that major 
shifts in partisanship surrounding the 1800 election reveal an 
electoral upheaval leading to major policy changes. 
The concept's application to the Federalist-Republican con-
flict is, however, strained by its presumption of a party system 
thoroughly infused in electoral politics. The theory supposes that 
realigned partisanship corresponds to "transformation in the 
shape of ... the voting universe,"4t but the 1790s party system 
arose as an instrument of the political elite. The system had also 
just begun to organize. Its geographical scope was limited and its 
purpose seen as temporary. The opposing parties did, neverthe-
less, distinguish candidates along policy lines and effectively mo-
38. Sisson, The American Revolution of 1800 at 336 (cited in note 4). 
39. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of the KentuCky Resolutions, in American Statesmen at 
17 (cited in note 33). 
40. Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Poli-
tics 10 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1970). 
41. ld. at 12 
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bilize the electorate during the 1790s and the 1800 campaign. A 
cautious application of the realignment thesis thus seems 
warranted. 
Party identification began with Hamilton's economic pro-
posals in the early 1790s. In the presidential election of 1796, 
after Republican opposition ideology had developed, Jefferson 
came within three electoral votes of winning the presidency. 
(See Table I) Following the XYZ affair,4z which embarrassed 
TABLE I* 
Presidential House Senate Fed. Fed. Fed. 
Year Electors Members Members ReE. ReE. ReE· 
1792 77" 55" 54 52 17 13 
1794 48 57 19 13 
1796 71 68 58 48 20 12 
1798 63 43 19 13 
1800 65 73 41 65 14 18 
1802 39 102 9 25 
1804 14 162 25 116 7 27 
1806 24 118 6 28 
1808 47 122 48 94 6 28 
1810 36 108 6 30 
1812 b 128 68 112 9 27 
1814 65 117 11 25 
1816 34 183 42 141 10 32 
1818 27c 156 7c 35 
*Adapted from William Nisbet Chambers, Political Parties in a New Nation 182 (Oxford 
U. Press, 1963), which relies on data from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (1960), corrected by later data, where available. 
b The fusion of DeWitt Clinton Republican faction and Federalists: 89 
' Local remnants of national party, "nominally Federalists." 
Republicans, Federalists scored big gains in the 1798-1799 con-
gressional elections, especially in the South. These gains resulted 
in invigorated Republican efforts as they looked ahead to the 
1800 election. Internal division among the Federalist leaders 
broke their ranks, and the 1800 election ushered Jefferson into 
the presidency. Adams won several states, but the Federalists 
suffered a major loss in the congressional elections. The Federal-
ist party endured past 1800, exhibiting some force until its ill-
fated Hartford Convention attack on Madison's handling of the 
War of 1812. By 1820, the party could not nominate a candidate. 
The Republican party, in contrast, endured and successfully im-
plemented much of its political program.43 Table I shows the de-
42. See supra note 32. 
43. See Bailyn, Great Republic at 386-87 (cited in note 4). 
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cline of support for Federalist presidential and congressional 
candidates, relative to Republican increases. 
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW/JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 
The Federalists staffed the first Supreme Court with Federal-
ists, and early Court decisions reflected partisan leanings and 
gave rise to livid Republican criticism. In 1796, in Ware v. Hyl-
ton,44 the Court declared invalid a Virginia statute sequestering 
pre-Revolutionary War debts of British creditors. The peace 
treaty between the Americans and British stipulated no impedi-
ments on the recovery by British subjects of debts due them by 
Americans. The Court held that the treaty nullified earlier Vir-
ginia law, destroyed payments made under it, revived the debt, 
and gave rights of recovery against the debtor, notwithstanding 
payment made under the authority of state law. The Court's sub-
ordination of state law to treaties with respect to the very sensi-
tive issue of Revolutionary debts "led to Republican criticism of 
the judges as Pro-British Federalists."4s 
Chisholm v. Georgia,46 decided in 1793, involved the ques-
tion whether the federal judiciary may summon a state as defend-
ant and adjudicate its rights or liabilities. Despite assurances in 
The Federalist Papers that such jurisdiction would be unavailable 
to federal courts, the Supreme Court held that federal courts do 
possess such authority. The decision resulted in a Republican-led 
"states' rights" backlash and the proposed Eleventh Amend-
ment, which limited federal jurisdiction in cases of suits against 
states. The Federalists ultimately conceded the Eleventh 
Amendment in 1798, amid "the rising Republican clamor ... for 
a new constitutional convention . . . .47 The Eleventh Amend-
ment notwithstanding, Chisholm did represent the Federalist vi-
sion of consolidating power under a central government. 
Common law also became a divisive political issue in the 
1790s. In short, the question was whether federal common law 
jurisdiction existed. The issue had been raised in United States v. 
Worrall,48 where the losing defense attorney, a Republican, had 
maintained that the criminal common law charge against his cli-
ent contravened the limitations on federal power represented in 
44. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
45. Alfred H. Kelly et al., The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 
166 (W.W. Norton & Co., 6th ed. 1983) ("The American Constitution"). 
46. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
47. See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 113 (1989). 
48. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798). 
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the Tenth Amendment. But during the foreign policy crisis of 
1798, the Federalists sought to prosecute seditious libel in federal 
courts under the common law, and their success led to passage of 
the Judiciary Act of 1801, which extended the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to all cases in law and equity arising under the U.S. 
Constitution and federal law. 
The Sedition Act would soon provide the statutory basis for 
sedition prosecution, but until then, the sweeping jurisdiction 
granted the federal courts under the Judiciary Act alerted 
Republicans to the possibility that a national common law might 
be presumed by the Federalists. Common law reached virtually 
every area of life, so to assume a national common law, Republi-
cans charged, would mean granting to Congress general legisla-
tive power, a violation of the limited national power guaranteed 
by the Constitution. In 1800 Jefferson commented: "If the princi-
ple were to prevail of a common law being in force in the U.S., [it 
would] possess the general government at once of all the powers 
of the state governments and reduce [the country] to a single 
consolidated government."49 
III. DID A SUPER-MAJORITY WIN THE STRUGGLE? 
The inquiry now turns to whether widespread acceptance of 
Republican ideology and programs followed the party's rise to 
power. "Widespread acceptance" is tested by looking to the long-
term status of policies and principles and any indicators that the 
relevant policies and principles gained, for at least an historical 
moment, strong public support. 
1. Political economy: a retrenchment of commercialism. Jef-
ferson quickly sought to retrench the economic program on 
which the Federalists had embarked. In the first session of Con-
gress after his election, Jefferson considered abolishing the whole 
system of internal taxation the Federalists had adopted. Fearing 
the effects of such a sudden cutoff in revenues, the plan imple-
mented was not so ambitious, but was enough that governmental 
cutbacks were required. Indeed, upon retrenchment, one half of 
federal administrative offices were abolished, with many cut-
backs in the military.so 
Retrenchment, however, was not complete. The Republi-
cans spared the national bank-the institution previously incom-
mensurable with the Republican vision of political economy. 
49. The American Constitution at 171 (cited in note 45) (quoting Jefferson, no cite 
provided). 
50. ld. at 23. 
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Jefferson maintained that since it had already been established, 
he could not in good faith abolish it.Sl Madison, in fact, came to 
support the bank. The War of 1812 required the development of 
manufacturing war material, and this further distorted the agra-
rian vision of political economy.sz The Louisiana Purchase 
would greatly raise the public debt, but it had fallen before and 
would eventually fall again-dramatically so.s3 Following the 
1812 war, sectional differences over matters of economic devel-
opment, such as tariffs and internal improvements, fundamen-
tally divided Republicans and served to erode their "common 
good" ideology.s4 Those partisans carrying the Republican ban-
ners of 1798 and 1800 became known as the "old Republicans." 
"New Republicans," Leonard White explains, included a former 
staunch Federalist, John Quincy Adams, and were "nationalist in 
outlook .... They stood for the broad construction of national 
power, for an active employment of those powers, for a strong 
navy, for a well-organized army, for a United States Bank, for a 
tariff, for internal improvements, and for a foreign policy that 
looked toward the further acquisition of territory."ss These new 
Republicans were a policy force, but, as Richard Ellis notes, they 
were less successful in establishing a federal program of improve-
ments than old Republicans, many of whom had voted for the 
bank on the belief that it was the only means of securing eco-
nomic stability following the 1812 war and proliferation of 
banks.s6 Even so, in 1828 the new-Republican Secretary of 
Treasury cited Alexander Hamilton as authority for economic 
policy .57 
2. Legitimate opposition. Given the popular and intellectual 
disdain for political parties, both the Republicans and Federalists 
had conceived their party machinery as more aberrations neces-
sary for the preservation of the Union. But party organizations 
endured beyond the rise of the Republicans in 1800. Shortly af-
ter the election, in fact, the party system began to make institu-
tional changes in American politics. First, it marked the triumph 
of parties over politicians. Before the advent of parties, candi-
dates in elections were judged according to character, personal-
51. Russell L Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America 103-04 (Princeton 
U. Press, 1985). 
52. Id. at 105. 
53. Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion at 279 (cited in note 15). 
54. Hanson, Democratic Imagination at 106-07 (cited in note 51). 
55. Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians 14 (Macmillan Co., 1951). 
56. Richard E. Ellis, The Persistence of Antifederalism after 1789, in Richard 
Beeman et al., eds., Beyond Confederation 295 (U. of N. Carolina Press, 1987). 
57. White, The Jeffersonians at 14 (cited in note 55). 
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ity, qualifications or integrity. With party affiliation becoming a 
more relevant consideration, the stigma attached to campaigning 
for office declined; the effort could be viewed as a contribution to 
the party cause. Indeed, by 1800, as Cunningham observes, it 
was a political asset to have the reputation of being a party 
man.ss Party affiliation revealed to voters a candidate's policy 
preferences and perhaps even his moral character, both of which 
were important electoral considerations. In the next two de-
cades, civic virtue-a primary tenet of Republicanism-became 
identified with party regularity.s9 
Second, as James Ceasar observes, enduring party machin-
ery led to a transformation of the presidential selection system. 
Republicans introduced and, by their actions, "helped to legiti-
mize the idea of the candidate as a party leader."6o They demon-
strated that victory in national elections could supply energy for 
the president. They also implemented changes in electoral insti-
tutions, including the congressional caucus for purposes of candi-
date nominations and the 1\velfth Amendment, which allowed 
the separation of electoral votes for president and vice-
president.6I 
It also is important to note that the foreign-born, who were 
direct targets of the Alien and Sedition laws, faced different gov-
ernmental policy following the Republican victory. First, the 
Alien and Sedition laws had expired and were not renewed. Sec-
ond, the Republicans, in the first session of Congress after the 
election, passed a new naturalization act, restoring the require-
ments under Washington's administration. "Five years' residence 
would once more suffice to make the foreign-born an American 
citizen, with three years' notice of intention."62 
3. Weakening the central government. Gordon Wood com-
ments that during the first three decades of the 1800s, particu-
larly after Jefferson left the presidency, "the United States was 
weaker than at any other time in its national history."63 Jefferson 
sought to weaken the central government by retrenching the 
Hamiltonian economic program, dismantling the federal judicial 
58. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans at 254 (cited in note 17). 
59. ld. at 254-55.; see also Hanson, Democratic Imagination at 118-19 (cited in note 
51). 
60. James W. Ceasar, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development 96 (Princeton 
U. Press, 1979). 
61. ld. 
62. James Schouler, 2 History of the United States of America: Under the Constitu-
tion 27 (Dodd, Mead & Co., rev. ed. 1970). 
63. Bailyn, et al., The Great Republic at 280 (cited in note 4) (Wood is the author of 
a particular section of the book). 
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circuitry and encouraging strict construction of the Constitution. 
Economic retrenchment, as explained above, was partially 
achieved. With regard to the judiciary, the Republicans repealed 
the 1801 Judiciary Act, which had given expansive jurisdiction to 
federal courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 thus was revived, and 
the Republicans passed another law providing for annual instead 
of semi-annual sessions of the Supreme Court. Jefferson's use of 
executive authority in making the Louisiana Purchase has been 
cited as an example of both the enormous power retained by the 
central government under the Republicans and an abandonment 
of the principle of strict constitutional construction.64 Notwith-
standing the exercise of such power, Ellis notes that the turnover 
of two-thirds of the House of Representatives in the 1816 elec-
tion "put a halt to any further nationalist legislation."6s 
If Supreme Court opinions serve as a barometer of higher 
law, then Republican success in retrenchment of central govern-
ment generally, and the power to enforce it, may be gleaned from 
John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison. Prior to the 
1803 decision, the Federalists had attempted three times to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the Republican-led repeal of the 
1801 Judiciary Act (which had resulted in Federalist judges favor-
ing governmental prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition 
Acts), but each effort failed. There is little doubt that Marshall's 
defense of judicial review in the Supreme Court reflects Federal-
ist interests, but his refusal to issue the mandamus suggests he 
recognized the possibility that such an order would be ignored. 
As James O'Fallon observes, "Marbury was born out of political 
defeat."66 It is also interesting to note that in 1804 the Republi-
cans would seek to impeach one of the most partisan Federalist 
judges, Samuel Chase, who arguably influenced Marshall's analy-
sis in Marbury.67 Impeachment would ultimately remove John 
64. See Ellis, Persistence of Antifederalism at 304 (cited in note 56); see also White, 
The Jeffersonians at 32-33 (cited in note 55). 
65. Ellis, Persistence of Anti federalism at 3CJ7 (cited in note 56). 
66. James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219,259 (1992). Kelly, Harbison, 
and Belz take a similar position: 
Though critical of the executive, Marshall refused to issue the mandamus, thus 
letting the administration win the battle. He recognized, moreover, a sphere of 
discretionary political action in which the judiciary lacked competence to judge 
of constitutionality or determine the meaning of the Constitution. Acquiescing 
to this extent in the political power that Jefferson represented, Marshall never-
theless established a limit beyond which the political branches could not go .... 
Bold as Marshall's strategy was ... , his assertion of judicial review was thus 
basically defensive in nature. 
Kelly et al., The American Constitution at 181 (cited in note 45). 
67. O'Fallon, 44 Stan. L. Rev. at 253-54 (cited in note 66). 
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Pickering from the federal bench, but not Chase-a bitter disap-
pointment for Jefferson.68 
The common law question was also eventually resolved in 
favor of the Republicans. In United States v. Hudson and Good-
win,69 the Supreme Court held that federal common law indict-
ments (which here had been issued at the bequest of 
Republicans) were invalid because federal courts had no com-
mon law jurisdiction. The Court maintained a strict construction-
ist view of constitutional interpretation.7o Ironically, the charge 
can be made that Jefferson abandoned his strict construction 
principle in effecting the Louisiana Purchase.n Also, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the majority opinion in Fletcher v. Peck,n 
penned by Marshall, advances an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's contract clause that can, as it did in this case, limit state 
power: "When ... a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute 
rights have vested under that contract, a [legislative] repeal of the 
law cannot devest those rights."73 Under Marshall and Justice 
Story, moreover, the Supreme Court would eventually enhance 
national power.74 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A successful constitutional moment, under the Ackerman 
framework, requires the existence of a potentially transformative 
political moment ultimately won by a super-majoritarian influ-
ence. On the basis of the preceding analysis, it seems evident 
that in the 1790s and in 1800 Jefferson and the Republicans cam-
paigned on an ideology that, if fully implemented, would trans-
form the political and economic terrain shaped by the Federalists 
in the first years of the republic. In the first decade of the Amer-
ican republic, the Federalists had begun commercializing the 
68. According to George Brown Tindall, Jefferson viewed the impeachment process 
as a "farce" after Chase's acquittal. George Brown Tindall, America: A Narrative His-
tory, 326 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1984) (Tindall provides no cite for Jefferson's comment). 
69. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
70. For a discussion of the extent to which Hudson addressed a tension between 
common law and the Constitution, see Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United 
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal 
Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale L.J. 919 (1992). 
71. White, The Jeffersonians at 14 (cited in note 55); but see Banning, The Jefferso-
nian Persuasion at 279 (cited in note 15). 
72. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
73. ld. at 135. 
74. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that 
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state courts); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (finding congressional authority to incorporate a bank under 
the "necessary and proper" provision of the U.S. Const., Art I, § 8). 
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economy, strengthening the central government against state 
power, and pursuing a foreign policy favoring British interests. 
The Republicans extolled the civic virtues of the yeoman farmer 
and promised to reverse both commercialism and the encroach-
ment of national authority over state and local governments. 
Fundamental change lasting until and through the next criti-
cal period in American history may be attributed to Republican 
efforts following the 1800 election. In the spirit of civic virtue, 
the Republicans retrenched the scope of national government 
and repudiated much of Hamilton's economic program. Central 
authority was curtailed by stripping the federal judiciary of much 
of its jurisdiction and reshaping the circuitry. But the judiciary 
still managed to enhance national power. The despised national 
bank survived, moreover, and the "new" Republicans of the 
1810s favored economic policies originally advanced by the Fed-
eralists before 1800. The 1820s, however, witnessed a revival of 
more traditional Republican ideology. Thus, Ackerman's con-
clusion that the Jeffersonian revolution produced fundamental 
change, but not of a sweeping nature, seems apt.75 
There is, nevertheless, an important question about constitu-
tional change raised by the Jeffersonian Revolution and unad-
dressed by Ackerman: whether unintended fundamental change 
waxes constitutional. Jefferson's method of campaigning for 
president changed presidential selection politics so as to effect 
the Twelfth Amendment in 1804, but there is no evidence that 
the Republicans sought such change in their campaign against 
the Federalists. Also, despite both Republican and Federalist 
disdain for political parties, party machinery survived the 1800 
revolution and, of course, evolved into the sophisticated system 
integral to the political process in the United States today. The 
infusion of parties into the infrastructure of American politics 
probably gives them tacit constitutional force, but Ackerman's 
theory offers little direct interpretive insight. The 1800 revolu-
tion thus may reveal that constitutional politics occasionally 
result in changes not originally part of a movement's transforma-
tive agenda. Ackerman's depiction of constitutional moments as 
deliberations by "the People" therefore may, in some instances, 
mistakenly presuppose a controlling consciousness in the process 
of constitutional development. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. 
